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ABSTRACT
Non-compete agreements are commonly used in both
the United States and China, and are regarded as an
important means for employers to prevent employees or
rival companies from using valuable trade secrets for
competitive purposes. Despite their popularity, however,
the enforceability of non-competes in both countries can be
difficult to determine. In the U.S., the level to which noncompetes are fully enforced varies by jurisdiction. While
some state courts apply a “rule of reason,” others, such as
California, prohibit non-competes altogether. In contrast,
Chinese courts tend to support non-competes. This Article
provides a comparative perspective of non-competes in the
U.S. and China, highlighting different factors that the two
countries consider when deciding enforceability.
Specifically, courts in the U.S. focus on the existence of
legitimate business interests, while courts in China focus
on economic compensation. In order to curb the overenforcement of non-compete agreements in China and keep
the balance between trade secret protection and employee
*
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mobility, this Article recommends that China define the
protectable business interest by statute and narrowly
construe the validity of non-compete agreement.
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INTRODUCTION
Trade secrets are one of the most important types of intellectual
property. Approximately seventy percent of the market value of
U.S. companies exists in the form of trade secrets and other types
of intellectual property.1 Trade secrets range from the formula for
Coca-Cola to the client list of a small startup company. Employees
create and accumulate trade secrets in the course of their work.
Over the course of their employment, employees may learn about
technology, designs and specifications, and gain access to
customer lists, sales and financial data; such knowledge of trade
secrets makes them more valuable to their employer, but also to the
employer’s competitors. For this reason, departure of employees to
competing companies has become one of the primary channels for
trade secret misappropriation, and companies must take measures
to protect their trade secrets from disclosure by former employees
to third parties and competitors.2
To this end, the non-compete agreement (“non-compete”)3 has
been widely used by companies as the primary weapon with which
to protect trade secrets from misappropriation by former
employees and to maintain a competitive position in the
marketplace. In 2010, more than seventy-eight percent of all chiefexecutive employment contracts in the U.S. contained a noncompete provision.4
Yet, despite the undisputed benefit to employers, scholars
highlight a significant negative side effect of non-competes: their
impact on knowledge dissemination. 5 To continue to encourage
1

See William M. Fitzpatrick, Samuel A. DiLullo, & Donald R. Burke,
Trade Secret Piracy and Protection: Corporate Espionage, Corporate Security
and the Law, 12 ADVANCES IN COMPETITIVENESS RES. 57 (2004).
2
Id.
3
There are several names used for a non-compete, such as a “covenant not
to compete,” or “noncompetition agreement.” This Article uses “non-compete”
or “non-competes.”
4
See Chris Neumeyer, Trade Secrets and Employee Mobility in the U.S.
and Asia, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/
10/09/trade-secrets-and-employee-mobility-in-the-u-s-and-asia/id=45666/.
5
See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology
Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete,
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innovation and create a welcoming environment for technical
talent, some states in the U.S. have limited the extent to which they
will enforce a non-compete. 6 In China, a similar transition is
underway. In light of this trend, the enforceability of the noncompete in China needs to be balanced against technological
innovation and trade secret protection.
This Article compares the use of non-competes in the U.S. and
China for trade secret protection. Following the introduction in
Part I, Part II of this Article describes the need for non-competes in
the U.S., including an overview of the history of non-competes and
trade secret law, and a discussion of the most important factors that
influence enforceability of non-competes—the “protectable
business interest.” Part III compares differing approaches in both
U.S. and Chinese courts to non-competes for trade secret
protection. Part IV discusses the differences between the two
countries. Lastly, Part V makes recommendations for the noncompete legal system in China.
I. NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS FOR TRADE SECRET PROTECTION
IN THE UNITED STATES
A non-compete term in an employment contract typically states
that the employee will not work for a competitor or set up a
competitive business for a specified period of time in a designated
geographical area. 7 It is a post-employment prohibition that bars
the employee from what may be his or her most productive use of
skills, knowledge, and work experience. 8 Nowadays, the noncompete is regarded as an important and popular means for
employers to prevent employees or competitors from using their
valuable trade secrets.
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999); see also Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Leaky
Covenants-Not-To-Compete As The Legal Infrastructure For Innovation, 49
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 251 (2015).
6
See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 5.
7
See Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 625, 626 (1960).
8
See Charles Tait Graves & James A. Diboise, Do Strict Trade Secret and
Non-Competition Laws Obstruct Innovation?, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J.
323, 330 (2007).
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A. History of Non-Compete Agreements in the United States
Non-competes first appeared as traditional common law
“restraints of trade” in England more than five hundred years ago.9
The most important case from this era remains Mitchel v.
Reynolds,10 which recognized that partial restraints on trade under
certain circumstances might be enforceable. 11 Although Mitchel
related the concept of a non-compete to the sale of a business,
rather than to employment, it deeply influenced nineteenth-century
courts’ approach to employment-restraints in two ways: (1) it
created an open attitude towards the validity of restrictive
covenants,12 and (2) it introduced a standard that “balanc[ed] the
social utility of restraints against their possible undesirable effects
upon the covenanter and the public.”13
Mitchel provided the basis for the modern approach to
restraints in U.S. employment contracts.14 Since the beginning of
the twentieth century, most American courts have applied the
“reasonableness” standard to evaluate the enforceability of noncompetes. 15 California, which bans the enforcement of noncompetes, is the prominent exception.
The popularity of non-competes grew in large part to the rise of
the Industrial Revolution and the necessity of trade secret
protection. In the pre-industrial economy, craft knowledge was
9

See Blake, supra note 7, at 626.
See Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711). In Mitchel, the
defendant was a baker who violated a restrictive covenant he had signed when
he leased his bakery to the plaintiff. The defendant argued that the covenant was
invalid because he was a baker, had served an apprenticeship there, and could
not be restrained from practicing his trade. The court supported the covenant in a
detailed opinion justifying its decision. See also Catherine L. Fisk, Working
Knowledge: Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in Employment, and the Rise
of Corporate Intellectual Property, 1800–1920, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 454
(2001).
11
See Mark A. Glick, Darren Bush & Jonathan Q. Hafen, The Law and
Economics of Post-Employment Covenants: A Unified Framework, 11 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 357, 360–70 (2002).
12
See Fisk, supra note 10, at 455.
13
Blake, supra note 7, at 630.
14
Id. at 637.
15
Glick, Bush & Hafen, supra note 11.
10
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transmitted through families or from master to apprentice. Secrets
were controlled exclusively within a family or a firm. 16 The
Industrial Revolution dramatically altered such working
relationships in businesses. Firms began to rely on non-competes
so that employers could safeguard secret information learned by
current or former employees. Courts adapted to the trends by
expanding permissible uses of non-competes to prevent wrongful
dissemination of knowledge.17
B. Overview of Non-Compete Agreements in Different States
In the U.S., non-compete enforcement is governed by state law.
States regulate through either statutory or common law. Twenty
states18 have statutes which specifically regulate non-competes.19
The remaining thirty regulate the use of non-competes via case
law. Most states apply a “rule of reason” to non-competes,20 where
enforceability depends on its measure of “reasonableness.” The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 21 for example, states that a
restraint is reasonable if it: (1) is no greater than is needed to
protect the [employer’s] legitimate interest; (2) does not impose
undue hardship on an employee; and (3) is not likely to be
injurious to the public.22
Generally, courts decide enforceability by considering all or
most of the following factors: (1) whether an employer’s legitimate
business interest exists; 23 (2) whether the geographic scope is
16

Fisk, supra note 10, at 450.
Id. at 442.
18
These states are Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and
Wisconsin. See BRIAN M. MALSBERGER, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE: A
STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (A.B.A. SEC. OF LAB. & EMP. L., 8th ed. 2012).
19
For example, the Texas Business & Commerce Code regulates noncompetes in § 15.50 (Criteria For Enforceability of Covenants Not To Compete).
See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (West 2009).
20
See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE (6th ed. 2012).
21
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1981).
22
Id.; see also Blake, supra note 7, at 649.
23
States using the rule of reason usually regard it as a prerequisite element
17
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reasonable; 24 (3) whether duration is reasonable; 25 (4) whether
adequate consideration exists;26 and (v) whether the non-compete
violates the public policy or imposes undue hardship on the
employee.27
Although non-competes are enforceable in most states,
provided that they meet the reasonableness requirement, several
states prohibit non-competes altogether. 28 One such state is
California, which has eliminated the common law “rule of reason”
and reshaped its public policy in favor of open competition.29 Civil
Code section 16600 states that “[e]xcept as provided in this
when deciding on enforceability of non-competes.
24
Geographic scope is another important factor when deciding
enforceability of a non-compete. In New York, a non-compete will be enforced
by courts “where the restrictions are reasonably limited geographically . . . to
protect trade secrets or confidential customer lists.” Geritrex Corp. v. Dermarite
Indus., 910 F. Supp. 955, 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
25
In Florida, “covenants that restrict or prohibit competition when they are
limited in time . . . are permissible.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.331 (2016).
26
Consideration is the basis of contract formation in the common law.
Courts usually find adequate consideration if an employer signs a non-compete
agreement or employment contract with the employee. However, some courts
will not find adequate consideration if a non-compete agreement is entered into
after an employment contract has begun and there is no independent
consideration given. In Pollard Group, Inc. v. Labriola, 100 P.3d 791 (Wash.
2004), the Washington State Supreme Court held that non-compete agreements
entered into after employment has commenced are valid only when there is
independent consideration given at the time the agreement is signed.
27
Many courts also consider undue hardship in conjunction with geographic
scope and/or duration. In King v. Head Start Family Hair Salons, Inc., 886 So.
2d 769 (Ala. 2004), the Alabama Supreme Court reversed an injunction issued
against a former employee of a hair salon that prohibited her from working
within a two-mile radius of any location of her former employer. The Court held
that the restriction was unreasonably broad and imposed an undue hardship on
the employee because the employer had more than thirty locations in the
relevant area, making it impossible for the employee to find work as a
hairdresser.
28
See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 5. Several states follow a variation of
California’s strong rule on non-competes, including Hawaii, North Dakota,
Montana, and Oklahoma. Montana and Oklahoma permit the enforcement of
non-competes in certain circumstances, while Colorado and Oregon limit noncompetes to managers and professional workers.
29
See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 5; see also MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY,
supra note 20, at 87.

412

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 11:5

chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained from
engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to
that extent void.”30 Thus, non-competes are void in California,31
subject to limited exceptions.32
C. Overview of Trade Secrets in the United States
Among the most influential sources of law on the development
of trade secrets in the U.S. are sections 757 and 758 of the
Restatement of Torts. Published in 1939, the Restatement defines a
trade secret as any information “used in one’s business [that gives
its owner] an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors
who do not know or use it.”33
30

CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (2016).
The Ninth Circuit developed the “narrow-restraint” exception to Section
16600 in Campbell v. Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 817 F.2d 499 (9th
Cir. 1987), concluding that Section 16600 “only makes illegal those restraints
which preclude one from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business.”
However, in Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 293 (2008), the
Supreme Court of California held that “California courts have not embraced the
Ninth Circuit’s narrow-restraint exception and have been clear in their
expression that section 16600 represents a strong public policy of the state
which should not be diluted by judicial fiat.”
32
Non-competition agreements are permitted if they are ancillary to the sale
of a business and the terms of the agreements are “reasonable.” According to
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16601 (2016):
Any person who sells the goodwill of a business, or any owner
of a business entity selling or otherwise disposing of all of his
or her ownership interest in the business entity, or any owner
of a business entity that sells (a) all or substantially all of its
operating assets together with the goodwill of the business
entity, (b) all or substantially all of the operating assets of a
division or a subsidiary of the business entity together with the
goodwill of that division or subsidiary, or (c) all of the
ownership interest of any subsidiary, may agree with the buyer
to refrain from carrying on a similar business within a
specified geographic area in which the business so sold, or that
of the business entity, division, or subsidiary has been carried
on, so long as the buyer, or any person deriving title to the
goodwill or ownership interest from the buyer, carries on a
like business therein.
33
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). See also MERGES,
31
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Beginning in 1979, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws developed a model state statute—the
Uniform Trade Secret Act (“UTSA”)34—which forty-eight states
have enacted in one form or another.35 In its 1985 Amendment, the
UTSA defined a “trade secret” as:
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or
process, that: (1) derives independent economic
value, actual or potential, from not being generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by
proper means by, other persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use, and (2) is
the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.36
Notably, this does not follow the Restatement. Instead, the
UTSA stipulates that information is not a trade secret if it is
“generally known” or “readily ascertainable by proper means.”37
Therefore, once a secret is readily available through public
sources, all trade secret protection is lost. In contrast, the
Restatement asserts that trade secret protection still exists as long
as it is not actually “known” to competitors even if it is
“knowable” through public sources.38
On May 11, 2016, however, President Obama signed the
Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (“DTSA”).39 This represented
the first time that U.S. law would provide a federal private right of
MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 20, at 35.
34
Id. at 36.
35
See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1. At that time, Texas, New York, and
Massachusetts had not adopted the UTSA, but as of September 1, 2013, Texas
had signed the UTSA into law.
36
See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1948) (amended
1985).
37
See MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 20, at 46.
38
Id.; see also Rohm & Haas Co. v. Adco Chem. Co., 689 F.2d 424 (3d Cir.
1982).
39
See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (amended 18 U.S.C. §§ 1832,
1833, 1835, 1836, 1838, 1839, and 1961).
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action exclusively for trade secret protection since the Economic
Espionage Act of 1996.
While its full use remains to be seen, the DTSA remains
cautious regarding employer protection. The Act prohibits
injunctions that “prevent a person from entering into an
employment relationship,” and if “any conditions [are] placed on
such employment,” it must be based on “evidence of threatened
misappropriation,” not “merely on the information the person
knows.”40
As such, trade secrets have historically had a broad scope in the
United States. “A trade secret can relate to technical matters, such
as the composition or design of a product, a method of
manufacture, or the know-how necessary to perform a particular
operation or service. 41 A trade secret can also relate to other
aspects of business operations such as pricing and marketing
techniques or the identity and requirements of customers.”42
However, there are still some limits. Courts have denied
protection to common information or procedures, including
recipes, cooking procedures for barbeque chicken43 and customer
lists posted on a company website.44

40

Id.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 cmt. f (1995).
42
Id.
43
In Buffets, Inc. v. Klinke, the Ninth Circuit held that “the detailed
procedures of recipes were readily ascertainable” and “many of them were
‘basic American dishes that are served in buffets across the United States.’” The
court further held that “the recipes were for such American staples as BBQ
chicken and macaroni and cheese and the procedures, while detailed, are
undeniably obvious.” Therefore, they are not entitled to trade secret protection.
See Buffets, Inc. v. Klinke, 73 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1996).
44
Dawn Rudenko Albert, Trade Secrets in the United States, INTELL. ASSET
MGMT. (July/Aug. 2010), http://www.iam-media.com/Magazine/Issue/42/
Management-report/Trade-secrets-in-the-United-States.
41
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D. The Enforceability of Non-Compete Agreements in U.S.
Courts—From the Perspective of Protectable
Business Interest
U.S. courts first look for a “protectable business interest” in
deciding whether to enforce a non-compete. A non-compete may
be enforceable if the employer can identify a legitimate business
interest. If the employer cannot demonstrate a legitimate business
interest in need of protection by the non-compete, the agreement
will not be enforceable in any respect.45 However, the line between
protectable and unprotectable business interests is often indistinct.
Today, trade secrets provide a necessary competitive advantage
to employers. Courts, however, have differed on whether
“confidential information” constitutes “protectable business
interests” under non-competes. The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts offers three examples of basic protectable interests: (1)
the customer relationship or good will; (2) trade secrets or other
confidential information; or (3) in the context of employment
relationships, unique attributes or skills possessed by an
employee.46
Many states regard “confidential business information” and
“customer relationships” as protectable business interest for noncompetes, some states also protect goodwill, extraordinary or
specialized training, and employees’ unique or extraordinary
services.47 Furthermore, lower courts have loosened common law
standards by broadening the definition of protectable business
interests of non-competes. 48 In Ingersoll-Rand v. Ciavatti, 49 the
New Jersey Supreme Court held that an employer has a legitimate
interest in protecting “highly specialized, current information not
generally known in the industry, created and stimulated by the
45

See, e.g., E.P.I. of Cleveland, Inc. v. Basler, 230 N.E.2d 552, 557 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1967).
46
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmts. b, c (1981).
47
See Russell Beck, Employee Noncompetes A State by State Survey,
BECK REED RIDDEN, LLP (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.beckreedriden.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/09/Noncompetes-50-State-Survey-Chart-20130814.pdf.
48
Id.
49
Ingersoll-Rand v. Ciavatti, 542 A.2d 879, 894 (N.J. 1988).
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research environment furnished by the employer, to which the
employee has been ‘exposed’ and ‘enriched’ solely due to his
employment.” 50 A similar expansion occurred in employee
education and training. In Borg-Warner Protective Services, Corp.
v. Guardsmark, Inc., 51 a Kentucky district court recognized
investments in generalized employee training as a legitimate
business interest, substantially broadening the scope of information
protected by non-competes.52
While these two cases highlight the expansion of protectable
business interests in the 1980s and 1990s, courts have recently
started to narrow the scope of a protectable interest under noncompetes, 53 curtailing further expansion under a modern
approach.54 In BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg,55 the Court of Appeals
of New York scrutinized the legitimacy of any interest claimed by
BDO under the common law standard and held that, unless a
former employee uses confidential information to obtain clients,
the employer’s interest is limited to the client relationships that the
employer enabled the employee to acquire in the performance of
his work.56
It is difficult to say whether this trend is reflected throughout
the U.S.; after all, Garrison only mentioned one example. In 2011,

50

See Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of
Employee Noncompete Agreements: Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy
Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 107 (2008).
51
Borg-Warner Protective Servs., Corp. v. Guardsmark, Inc., 946 F. Supp.
495, 502 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (concluding that the employer had a legitimate interest
in its investment of training and education in the guards, although neither
employer interest in trade secrets or goodwill, nor close relationships from the
guards with its customers existed); see also Garrison & Wendt, supra note 50.
52
See Garrison & Wendt, supra note 50.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1226 (N.Y. 1999)
(concluding that an employee’s status (a manager) in the firm was not based
upon the uniqueness or extraordinary nature of the accounting services he
generally performed on behalf of the firm, but mostly on his ability to attract a
corporate clientele); see also Garrison & Wendt, supra note 50.
56
BDO Seidman, 712 N.E.2d at 1225; see also Garrison & Wendt, supra
note 50.
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in Reliable Fire Equipment Company v. Arredondo,57 the Illinois
Supreme Court found that a legitimate business interest is not
limited to the two protectable interests identified in over thirty
years of precedent: (1) near permanent customer relationships; and
(2) trade secrets or confidential information. Instead, the court
stated that enforceability is dependent on the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the employer’s legitimate business
interest in a particular case. 58 Factors considered by the court
included, but were not limited to, the near-permanence of customer
relationships, the employee’s acquisition of confidential
information through his or her employment, and time and place
restrictions.59
II. NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS FOR TRADE SECRET
PROTECTION IN CHINA
As an old Chinese proverb says, “when an apprentice learns the
skill, his master will starve.” This proverb reflects the nature of
competition between the apprentice and master in the selfsufficient era before China’s Reform and Policies gradually
changed this economic form. To avoid competition, masters chose
apprentices carefully, considering their relationship (e.g., whether
they were relatives), their ability to expand the market, the
geographic area where an apprentice would work, and the
likelihood of obedience to the master. 60 Furthermore, the master
would keep secret his or her most valuable skills and not teach
them to the apprentice until the master completely trusted the
apprentice.61 This principle is similar to the early forms of trade
57

Reliable Fire Equip. Co. v. Arredondo, 965 N.E.2d 393, 403 (Ill. 2011).
Id.
59
Id.
60
Until the late 1980s, many areas of China, especially rural areas, heavily
relied on the masters and apprentices who produced different kinds of products
or tools for daily needs or farming. Houses were built by stonemasons,
bricklayer and carpenters together, furniture was made by a carpenter or bamboo
craftsman, or clothes were sewn by tailors. Master and apprentices travelled to
different villages and to make products in the homes of the villagers. See
HAILING SHAN, PROTECTION TRADE SECRETS IN CHINA 81 (1st ed. 2008).
61
Id.
58
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secret protection in England, where secrets were controlled
exclusively within a family or a firm.
A. Overview of Non-Compete Agreements in China
The concept of non-competes began to come to public attention
in China in the early 1990s. When the Anti-Unfair Competition
Law was issued in China in 1993, non-competes were not directly
mentioned in the statutory language. However, Articles 2 and 10 of
the Anti-Unfair Competition Law 62 were often quoted as the basis
for non-compete cases regarding trade secret protection, well
before the regulation or the act directly regulating non-competes
was enacted.
Non-competes were first directly mentioned in Opinions
Regarding Mobility of Employee in Enterprises, 63 a ministerial62

Article 2 states that “business operators shall abide by the principle of
voluntariness, equality, impartiality, honesty and good faith, and also adhere to
public commercial moral in their business transactions.” Article 10 provides:
Business operators shall not use the following methods to
infringe trade secret: (1) acquiring trade secret of another by
theft, inducement, duress, or other illegal means; (2)
disclosing, using, or allowing others to use trade secret of
another acquired with the above illegal means; or (3)
disclosing, using, or allowing others to use trade secret in
breach of an agreement or a confidentiality obligation imposed
by a legal owner. Any act of a third-party who acquires, uses,
or discloses trade secrets that he knew or should have known
to have been misappropriated in any of the aforementioned
ways, shall be treated as the infringement of trade secret.
Trade secret means any technical and business information
that is unknown to the public, can bring economic benefits to
the rights holder, has practical utility, and for which the trade
secret owner has taken measures to maintain its
confidentiality.
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Buzhengdang Jingzheng Fa (中华人民共和
国 反 不 正 当 竞 争 法 ) [Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the PRC], NPC
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 2, 1993,
effective
Dec.
1,
1993),
Sept.
2,
1993,
available
at
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/05/content_4600.htm (China).
63
Guanyu Qiye Zhigong Liudong Ruogan Wenti De Tongzhi (关于企业职
工 流 动 若 干 问 题 的 通 知 ) [Opinions Regarding Mobility of Employee in

2016]

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS

419

level regulation issued by the Ministry of Labor in 1996. Article 2
of the regulation states that an employer can require that an
employee with knowledge of trade secrets not work in an
enterprise in competition with the employer within three years
after the expiration or termination of an employment contract,
provided that the non-compete agreement is signed by, and a
certain amount of compensation is given to, the employee.64
To meet demands for trade secret protection from emerging
high-tech or other technology companies, similar non-compete
provisions developed in other ministerial-level or local government
level regulations.65
Aside from these low-level regulations by ministries or local
governments, 66 however, China had no uniform national statute
governing non-competes before 2008. Nevertheless, in practice,
employers commonly required key employees to enter into noncompetes, even before the national statute including non-compete
provisions was enacted. Over time, the existence of non-competes
began to conflict with other basic laws, such as contract law, which
caused courts and the labor arbitration board to question noncompete enforceability. In order to regulate non-competes, the
National People’s Congress promulgated the Labor Contract
Law, 67 effective January 1, 2008, and formally covered nonEnterprises], WENKU (promulgated by the Ministry of Labor, 1996), available at
http://wenku.baidu.com/view/6b8c6f2f647d27284b735109.html (China).
64
Id.
65
Examples include Opinions Regarding Strengthening Trade Secret
Management in the Mobility of Technical Persons issued in 1997 by the
National Science and Technology Committee and other regulations issued by
local governments or local people’s congress, such as Trade Secret Protection
Regulation for Shenzhen Special Economic Zone in 1996, Trade Secret
Protection Regulation for Zhuhai Special Economic Zone in 1997, and
Regulation for Zhongguancun Science Park in 2001.
66
In China, State Council, ministries or agencies, provincial or some special
local governments or local people’s congress have the authority to issue
regulations. However, only National People’s Congress or its Standing
Committee can enact national laws, such as the Contract Law, Anti-Unfair
Competition Law, Labor Contract Law, and Supreme People’s Court has the
authority to issue interpretations for the national laws. The three main sources of
the Chinese legal system are laws, regulations, and interpretations.
67
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Hetongfa (中华人民共和国劳
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competes in Articles 23 and 24:
Article 23. An employer and an employee may
include in their labor contract confidentiality
provisions in respect of the employer’s trade secrets
and other confidential matters with regard to
intellectual property.
If an employee has a confidentiality obligation, the
employer may contract with the employee to
include non-competition provisions in the labor
contract or confidentiality agreement, and agree to
pay financial compensation to the employee on a
monthly basis during the non-competition period
after the termination or revocation of the labor
contract. If the employee breaches the noncompetition provisions, he shall pay liquidated
damages to the employer in accordance with the
stipulated terms.
Article 24. The personnel subject to noncompetition obligations shall be only applied to the
employer’s senior management, senior technicians
and other individuals with confidentiality
obligations. The scope, geographical limitations and
term of the non-competition obligations shall be
agreed upon by the employer and the employee, and
such non-competition agreement shall not violate
any laws and regulations.68
After the revocation or termination of a labor
contract, the non-competition period for any of the
persons mentioned in the preceding paragraph in
动合同法) [Labor Contract Law of the PRC] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 29, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) GOV.CN, art.
23,
June
29,
2007,
available
at
http://www.gov.cn/flfg/200706/29/content_669394.htm (China).
68
Id.
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terms of his working for a competing employer that
produces or deals with the same type of products or
engages in the same type of business, or in terms of
his setting up his own business to produce or deal
with the same type of products or to engage in the
same type of business, shall not exceed two years.69
These articles describe the major elements of non-competition:
(1) an employment agreement may include non-compete
provisions intended to protect trade secrets and other confidential
matters of an employer; 70 (2) the non-compete shall only be
applied to senior management, senior technicians, and other
individuals with confidentiality obligations; 71 (3) restrictions on
business scope, geographic area, and duration shall be reasonable
and agreed upon by each other, and the duration shall not exceed
two years; (4) an employer must pay reasonable compensation to
the employee on a monthly basis throughout the duration of the
term of the non-compete;72 and (5) if the employee breaches the
non-compete, the employee shall pay the employer the damages
agreed upon in the contract.73

69

See Labor Contract Law of the PRC, supra note 67.
It is arguable whether the trade secrets and other confidential matters of
the employer is the protectable business interest for the non-compete. This topic
will be discussed later.
71
Some courts have included senior sales staffs in this category, while
blanket agreements that apply to all employees are invalid.
72
There is no definition of “reasonable compensation” in Labor Contract
Law, but according to the judicial interpretations in 2013 by the Supreme
People’s Court of China, an employer who can pay thirty percent of an
employee’s annual salary every year might be considered reasonable
compensation.
73
See Dan Harris, Employee Non-Compete Agreements In China. It’s
Complicated, CHINA LAW BLOG (Jan. 20, 2010), http://www.chinalawblog.com/
2010/01/employee_noncompete_agreements.html.
70
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B. Overview of Trade Secret Law in China
Unlike in the U.S., where the UTSA has been adopted in
almost every state, there is no uniform trade secret law in China.
China’s governance of trade secrets is guided by scattered laws and
regulations. Of these statutes, the most significant is the AntiUnfair Competition Law, 74 supplemented by case law from the
Supreme People’s Court. 75 Additionally, other laws such as
contract law, company law, and criminal law have some provisions
that can govern trade secret issues in special circumstances
accordingly.
The Anti-Unfair Competition Law, enacted in 1993, defines
trade secrets in Article 10 as “technical and business information
that is unknown to the public, can bring economic benefits to the
rights holder, has practical utility, and for which the trade secret
owner has taken measures to maintain its confidentiality.”76 Article
10 further prescribes three forms of trade secret misappropriation:
(1) acquiring trade secret of another by theft, inducement, duress,
or other illegal means; (2) disclosing, using, or allowing others to
use the trade secrets of another acquired with the above illegal
means; or (3) disclosing, using, or allowing others to use trade
secrets in breach of an agreement or a confidentiality obligation
imposed by a legal owner.77
In January 2007, the Supreme People’s Court issued a Judicial
Interpretation on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of
Law in Trials of Civil Cases Involving Unfair Competition, which
touched upon issues of trade secret protection.78 The Interpretation
74

See Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the PRC, supra note 62.
Strictly speaking, in a narrow sense, the interpretation (“Judicial
Interpretation”) by the Supreme People’s Court is not the law. Only the statute
enacted by National People’s Congress or its standing committee can be named
as the “law” in China. However, the Judicial Interpretation is very useful and
practical for the lower courts when hearing cases because Judicial Interpretation
provides courts the detailed interpretations of the laws. Over time, Judicial
Interpretation has become regarded by courts as one of the three main binding
sources, apart from statutes and regulations.
76
See Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the PRC, supra note 62.
77
Id.
78
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Buzhengdang Jingzheng Minshi
75
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provided a detailed explanation of the meaning of “unknown to the
public,” “economic benefits and practical utility,” and
“confidentiality measures.” 79 It also clarified its definition for
controversial types of information, including the types of customer
lists which could be recognized as trade secrets. The Interpretation
made it clear that customer lists could be protected as trade secrets
so long as they met the statutory requirements. 80 Customer lists
contain names, addresses, contact information, business patterns,
and business plans that are distinguishable from public information
and constitute specific customer information; they also include the
compilations of the names of general customers, and specific
customers with a long-term business relationship.81
Another important regulation concerning trade secret
protection is Provisions Regarding the Prohibition of Trade Secret
Infringement, which is the ministerial level of regulation issued by
the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”).82 It
describes administrative procedures for handling trade secret cases
and gives branch offices of SAIC power to investigate trade secret
misappropriation acts.83
Contract law also provides special trade secret protection in
contract negotiations; 84 company law stipulates trade secrets
Anjian Yingyong Falv Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi (最高人民法院关于审理不正
当 竞 争 民 事 案 件 应 用 法 律 若 干 问 题 的 解 释 ] [Interpretation of Supreme
People’s Court on Some Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial
of Civil Cases Involving Unfair Competition], WIPO (Sup. People’s Ct., Feb. 1,
2007), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/zh/details.jsp?id=6558 (China).
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Guojia Gongshang Xingzheng Guanli Ju Guanyu Jinzhi Qinfan Shangye
Mimi Xingwei De Ruogan Guiding (国家工商行政管理局关于禁止侵犯商业
秘密行为的若干规定) [Several Provisions on Prohibiting Infringements upon
Trade Secrets] (promulgated by the State Admin. for Indus. & Com. of the PRC,
Nov.
23,
1995,
effective
Nov.
23,
1995),
available
at
http://www.people.com.cn/zixun/flfgk/item/dwjjf/falv/7/7-5-08.html (China).
83
Id.
84
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hetong Fa ( 中华人民共和国合同法)
[Contract Law of the PRC] (promulgated by the Nat’1 People’s Cong., Mar. 15,
1999,
effective
Oct.
1,
1999),
art.
43,
available
at
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/06/content_4732.htm (China).
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obligations for senior management; 85 and criminal law provides
criminal action for trade secrets cases.86 87
C. The Enforceability of the Non-Compete Agreement in the Court
of China—From the Perspective of Protectable
Business Interests
An employer must have a legitimate business interest for a
non-compete to be valid. In the absence of a legitimate business
interest, there are no grounds to justify constraints on an
employee’s occupational liberty. According to a provision of
Article 23 in the Chinese Labor Contract Law, section 1, an
employer and an employee may include in their labor contract
confidentiality provisions regarding an employer’s intellectual
property. Section 2 provides that an employer may enter into a
non-compete with an employee, but does not specifically mention
“protectable business interests.” 88 This issue has been a huge
source of controversy, as courts are divided over whether the term
“protectable business interest” only encompasses a “trade secret”
or includes both “trade secrets” and “other confidential matters
with regard to intellectual property.”89
85

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa ( 中华人民共和国公司法)
[Company Law of the PRC] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’1
People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), art. 149(7), available at
http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2005-10/28/content_85478.htm (China).
86
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa ( 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 刑 法 )
[Criminal Law of the PRC] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar., 14,
1997,
effective
Oct.
1,
1997),
art.
219,
available
at
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/17/content_5004680.htm
(China).
87
See generally J. Benjamin Bai & Guoping Da, Strategies for Trade
Secrets Protection in China, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 357 (2011).
88
See Labor Contract Law of the PRC, supra note 67.
89
Although Labor Contract Law mentioned both “trade secret” and
“confidential information,” the definition of these two concepts is not
determined therein. “Trade secret” is defined in Anti-Unfair Competition Law
and subsequent Judicial Interpretation, while “confidential information” has no
specific provision. Some kinds of confidential information can be regarded as
“trade secret” if they meet certain requirements of trade secret. For example, for
customer lists to be trade secrets, they must be customers’ names, addresses,
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Two judicial viewpoints have emerged. The first is that the
scope of a protectable business interest extends to not only trade
secrets, but also other confidential matters. The second contends
that the validity of a given non-compete should be subject to
whether a trade secret is at issue.90
While the Supreme People’s Court remains silent, lower courts
have been split on the issue. According to research by Judge Tao
Gu,91 a majority of courts support the second view that validity of
a non-compete depends on the existence of an actual trade secret.92
Judge Gu lists several examples to support this narrower
interpretation, including a decision from the Higher People’s Court
of Beijing Municipality, which held that “the existence of
protectable interest—that is, the trade secret—is the precondition
to the validity of a non-compete, and that a non-compete cannot
exist if there is no trade secret protection.”93 The Higher People’s
Court of Zhejiang Province also held that “[a] non-compete must
have a reasonable purpose and cannot violate laws, regulations or
contacts, habits, purpose and content of transactions; and such information must
be special and independent from the generally known information by the public.
Generally, confidential information can be defined by the parties in the contract
and supported by Chinese law. For example, Section 2 of Article 60 of Contract
Law states that “the parties shall abide by the principle of good faith, and
perform obligations such as notification, assistance, and confidentiality, etc. in
light of the nature and purpose of the contract and in accordance with the
relevant usage.” Labor Contract Law of the PRC, supra note 67.
90
See Tao Gu, Lun Qinfan Shangye Mimi Jiufen Zhong Youguan Jingye
Xianzhi De Ruogan Falv Wenti (论侵犯商业秘密纠纷中有关竞业限制的若干
法律问题) [Study of Non-Compete Issues for Trade Secret Infringement], 5 J.L.
APPLICATION (法律适用) 58 (2013) (China).
91
Mr. Tao Gu is a senior judge and Vice Director working at the IP
Division of Higher People’s Court of Jiangsu Province. He accumulated rich
trial experience in the area of trade secret infringement and published an article
named Study of Non-Compete Issues for Trade Secret Infringement.
92
See Gu, supra note 90.
93
See Beijing Gaoyuan Minsanting Guanyu Beijingshi Fayuan Shenli
Buzhengdang Jingzheng Jiufen Anjian De Jiben Qingkuang Ji Zhuyao Zuofa (北
京高院民三庭关于《北京市法院审理不正当竞争纠纷案件的基本情况及主
要做法》) [No. 3 Civil Division of People’s Court of Beijing Municipality
Regarding the Basic Information and Practices for Hearing the Anti-Unfair
Competition Cases by the courts of Beijing] (unpublished) (on file with author)
(China); see also Gu, supra note 90.
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the public interest; the purpose of a non-compete is to protect the
trade secrets of the employer, rather than restricting competition
under the guise of a non-compete.” 94 Furthermore, the Higher
People’s Court of Shandong Province also held that “[a] noncompete shall be targeted to the necessary persons and with the
necessity of protecting the employer’s trade secrets.” 95 The
Supreme People’s Court indirectly expressed judicial policy,
however, when it held that “as to the case where neither a trade
secret exists, nor is a competitive field in the industry restricted by
a non-compete, the lower courts need to balance the relationship
between free competition and freedom to choose employers, and
the relationship between the non-compete obligation and employee
mobility; and courts cannot recklessly make the decision of
constituting anti-unfair competition simply on grounds of
diminishing certain advantages to the competition.” 96 Such a
94

See Zhejiang Gaoyuan Minsanting Guanyu Shangye Mimi Sifa Baohu
Wenti De Diaoyan Baogao (浙江高院民三庭关于《商业秘密司法保护问题的
调研报告》) [No. 3 Civil Division of People’s Court of Zhejiang Province
regarding the Research Report for the Issues of Trade Secret Judicial Protection]
(unpublished) (on file with author) (China); see also Gu, supra note 90.
95
See Shandong Gaoyuan Minsanting Guanyu Shangye Mimi Sifa Baohu
Wenti De Diaoyan Qingkuang Baogao (山东高院民三庭关于《商业秘密司法
保护问题的调研情况报告》) [No. 3 Civil Division of People’s Court of
Shandong Province regarding the Research Information Report for the Issues of
Trade Secret Judicial Protection] (unpublished) (on file with author) (China); see
also Gu, supra note 90.
96
See Xiaoming Xi, Chongfen Fahui Sifa Baohu Zhishi Chanquan Zhudao
Zuoyong Wei Shijian Kexue Fazhanguan He Jianshe Chuangxinxing Guojia
Tigong Jianqiang Youlide Sifa Baozhang—Zai Quanguo Fayuan Zhishi
Chanquan Shenpan Gongzuo Zuotanhui Ji Zhishi Chanquan Shenpan Gongzuo
Xianjin Jiti He Xianjin Geren Biaozhang Dahui Shang De Jianghua (《充分发
挥司法保护知识产权主导作用为实践科学发展观和建设创新型国家提供坚
强有力的司法保障——在全国法院知识产权审判工作座谈会暨知识产权审
判工作先进集体和先进个人表障大会上的讲话》) [Fully Play the Main Role
of the Judicial Protection for Intellectual Property so as to Provide the Robust
Judicial Safeguard for Practicing the Theory of Scientific Development and
Building the Innovation Country – the Speech on the Symposium for the
Intellectual Property Case Hearing and the Awards Ceremony for the
Individuals and Units of the Intellectual Property Hearing], CHINACOURT (Feb.
5, 2009), available at http://gxfy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=6032; see
also Gu, supra note 90.
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narrow interpretation reflects the attitude of the majority of courts
which have decided non-competition cases—namely, that a court’s
core function is to balance employee mobility and the rights of
employers in the context of economic development and social
stability.
Another example of the cautious attitude of the Supreme
People’s Court is a general opinion called the Guidance of Case
Trial on Employment Dispute under Current Situation. Article 10
of the opinion stipulates that:
[W]hen hearing the noncompetition cases, the
courts shall (1) take into full account the actual
level of the economy and technology development
in our country; (2) based on the public interests, not
only maintain fair competition in the socialist
market economy, but also balance the interests of
different market players; (3) avoid limiting the
employee’s freedom of career choice through the
inappropriate expansion of the scope of noncompetition; and (4) protect employers’ trade
secrets and other legal rights, so as to fulfill the
legislative intent and purpose of the noncompetitive
legal system to the full extent.97
Although the opinion of the Supreme People’s Court provides only
the general policy with which courts must comply, it still reflects a
cautious attitude towards the expansion of non-competes.
Two cases have provided examples of how courts have
determined protectable business interests. In Rao Haibo v. Beijing
New Giant Training School,98 Rao Haibo, a former vice-president
97

Guanyu Dangqian Xingshixia Zuohao Laodong Zhengyi Jiufen Anjian
Shenpan Gongzuode Zhidao Yijian (关于当前形势下做好劳动争议纠纷案件
审判工作的指导意见) [Guidance of Case Trial on Employment Dispute Under
Current Situation] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., 2009), available at
http://law.chinalawinfo.com/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=lawexplanation&Gid=1090
523960 (China).
98
See Rao Haibo Su Beijingshi Haidianqu Xinjuren Peixun Xuexiao (饶海
波 诉 北 京 市 海 淀 区 新 巨 人 培 训 学 校 ) [Rao Haibo v. Beijing New Giant
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in charge of the textbook research center of New Giant Training
School, appealed from a judgment holding that Rao Haibo violated
the non-compete and had to pay damages. Rao Haibo raised
several affirmative defenses, one of which was that New Giant is a
private and non-enterprise school and belongs to the non-profit
service organization, and as such could have no trade secrets. The
court held that, although the defendant is a private and nonenterprise school, the Labor Contract Law didn’t exclude such
schools from the application of non-compete provisions; and that
Rao Haibo could be regarded as a person governed by a noncompete because he knew and had access to New Giant’s training,
skills, and related information. The court further held that, in the
education-training field, a teacher’s training ability and business
information constitutes the essential competitiveness for the
education-training school, and such skills and information could be
protected as trade secrets. Based on this ruling, the appellate court
affirmed the district court’s decision.99
In Lin Zhenxian v. Shiyu Product Logo (Suzhou) Co.
(“Company”), 100 the appellant, Lin Zhenxian, appealed to the
Higher People’s Court of Jiangsu Province, from a judgment that
he had violated a non-compete because he worked at another
competitive company within the period forbidden by his noncompete and used a book containing trade secrets without
authorization from his former employer. Lin Zhenxian made
several affirmative defenses, including the fact that the book’s
content could already be found in the public domain and
accordingly did not qualify as a trade secret.
In deciding whether the book constituted a protectable interest
under the non-compete provision of the Labor Contract Law, the
appellate court quoted the definition of trade secrets from Article
Training School] 2015 NO. 1 FINAL CIVIL TRIAL NO. 02737], PKULAW (Beijing
No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct. 2015), available at http://www.pkulaw.cn/case/
pfnl_121768328.html (China).
99
Id.
100
See Lin Zhenxian Su Shiyu Chanpin Biaozhi (Suzhou) Youxian Gongsi
(林镇贤诉世誉产品标识(苏州)有限公司) [Lin Zhenxian v. Shiyu Product
Logo (Suzhou) Co.], (Jiangsu High People’s Ct. 2008); see also Gu, supra note
90.
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10 of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law. The court held that
“unknown to the public” means the information—whether as a
whole or as the specific construction or combination for each
part—is not known to the persons who often access this kind of
information in this field and is not easily obtained. However, Lin
Zhenxian had spent time, effort, and money analyzing factors
contributing to defect products in different manufacturing
processes and had filled the book with associated solutions. For
this reason, the book contained valuable technical information that
could not be obtained through public channels and would have
brought the Company a competitive advantage and economic
value. As such, the technical information mentioned in the book
could be protected by law as a trade secret.101
III. COMPARISONS: DIFFERENCES OF NON-COMPETES IN THE
U.S. & CHINA
A. U.S. Courts Are Cautious to Non-Competes
In the U.S., enforceability of non-competes varies from state to
state. While a few states prohibit non-competes altogether, most
states follow the reasonableness test in deciding whether a noncompete is enforceable. Generally, courts have construed noncompetes narrowly, presuming that they are invalid and
enforceable only upon proof that such contracts are reasonably
necessary for the protection of an employer’s business interest.102
A non-compete must reasonably limit the breadth of its subject
matter, the duration, and the geographic area in which former
employees can compete.103

101

100.

102

See Lin Zhenxian v. Shiyu Chanpin Biaozhi (Suzhou) Co., supra note

See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED
STATE DOCTRINES 118 (5th ed. 2004).
103
Id.
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B. Courts in China Have a Tendency to Support Non-Competes
To evaluate the general attitude in Chinese courts towards noncompetes, this Article analyzes all final judgments on non-compete
cases decided by intermediate or higher courts104 from March 2014
to February 2015.105 Thirty-six of these cases were related to the
validity of the non-compete; twenty-four of which were regarded
by courts as “valid and enforceable.” In other words, two out of
three non-compete cases were held to be “valid and enforceable”
by Chinese courts.106
C. Different Focus and Emphasis on the Non-Compete by Courts
in the U.S. & China When Deciding Its Enforceability
Traditionally, non-competes arose out of the need to protect
trade secrets and other valuable business information. Over time,
courts in England and the U.S. gradually began to enforce noncompetes. Modern U.S. courts view the protectable business
interest as a requisite element needed to enforce non-competes.
In Modern Environments v. Stinnett,107 Stinnett, a salesperson
for Modern, signed an employment agreement with Modern
containing a one-year non-compete clause. Within one year,
Stinnett accepted employment with a company which competed
with Modern. Modern notified Stinnett and her new employer by
letter that Stinnett’s employment with the competitor violated the
non-compete clause. 108 Soon afterwards, Stinnett filed a
declaratory judgment action to establish that the non-compete in
104

In China, common labor cases are filed in the basic people’s court and
appealed to the intermediate court when necessary. Very few cases are granted
certiorari by the provincial higher court. Trade secret infringement cases, on the
other hand, are filed in the intermediate court and appealed to the higher court in
different provinces.
105
Since January 1, 2014, all cases decided by all levels of courts in China
have been publicized and can be found on the website of Judicial Opinions of
China
established
by
Supreme
People’s
Court
at
http://www.court.gov.cn/zgcpwsw/.
106
See infra Appendix.
107
Modern Env’ts v. Stinnett, 561 S.E.2d 694 (Va. 2002).
108
Id.
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question was overbroad and unenforceable. The Virginia Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court’s decision that the non-compete was
unenforceable because the defendant failed to present evidence of
any protectable business interest served by prohibiting Stinnett
from being employed in any capacity by a competing company.109
Similarly, in Reliable Fire Equipment Company v.
Arredondo,110 the Illinois Supreme Court looked at employee noncompetes under the three-prong rule of reasonableness where the
legitimate business interest of the employer is a long-established
component. 111 In this case, the lower courts had held that noncompetes were not enforceable where the employer had failed to
prove the existence of a legitimate business interest that justified
enforcement. Although the Illinois Supreme Court overruled and
rejected the appellate court’s verdict, which limited the “legitimate
protectable interests” to either “near-permanent” customer
relationships or confidential information, the Court held that the
“legitimate business interest” precedent remains intact, but only as
a non-conclusive example of applying the legitimate business
interest.112
By contrast, the enforceability of non-competes in China
generally depends on whether employers compensated departing
employees reasonably. In the analysis of the thirty-six noncompete cases,113 only twelve were held invalid. Nine were held
invalid due to the employer’s failure to pay reasonable
compensation according to the employment contracts or Labor
Contract Law. Only three cases were invalid based on a lack of
legitimate business information or findings that employers had
failed to provide evidence that employees actually accessed the
trade secrets in question.114
109

Id. at 695.
Reliable Fire Equip. Co. v. Arredondo, 965 N.E.2d 393 (Ill. 2011).
111
Id. at 400.
112
Id.; see also KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, Kirkland Alert: New Illinois
Supreme Court Decision Requires Detailed Analysis of Restrictive Covenants,
KIRKLAND.COM (Dec. 2011), http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/
Alert_121611.pdf.
113
See infra Appendix.
114
These three cases are (1) Jiangsu Niupai Fangzhi Jixie Youxian Gongsi
Su Zou Daoyong (江苏牛牌纺织机械有限公司诉邹道勇) [Jiangsu Niupai
110
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The following court structure in China may provide an
explanation as to the reason that the judges have focused more on
economic compensation rather than on protectable business
interests in non-compete cases. Courts in China, especially in the
intermediate or high courts, have different divisions to hear
different types of cases. These divisions include the civil, criminal,
administrative, and intellectual property divisions, among others.
Usually, the civil division of the court decides non-compete cases
because such cases belong to the category of labor law cases,
which falls in the domain of the civil division, while the
intellectual property division of the court decides trade secret
infringement cases. As a result, when trade secret cases fall to the
intellectual property division, a judge specializing in intellectual
property decides whether the information constitutes a trade secret.
By comparison, civil division judges are generally not well-versed
enough in intellectual property law to decide trade secret issues.115
Another practical reason may be that the protectable business
interest is not the key issue for the parties. Unlike the U.S. where
the employer usually files non-compete claims, in China, both the
employer and the employee may file for non-compete claims—
usually disputing compensation. As such, courts often consider
compensation first, and only make a limited examination as to
Textile Mach. Co. v. Zhou Daoyong], PKULAW (Yangzhou Interm. People’s Ct.
2014),
available
at
http://fjlx.pkulaw.cn/Case/pfnl_121476260.html?
match=Exact; (2) Chongqing Suotong Chuguo Qihua Youxian Gongsi Su Liu
Ying ( 重庆索通出国企划 有限公司 诉刘影) [Chongqing Suotong Chuguo
Planning Co. v. Liu Ying], OPENLAW (Chongqing No. 5 Interm. People’s Ct.
2014),
available
at
http://openlaw.cn/judgement/98ce438f53de436
bad87dda8c8bd436e; and (3) Guangdong Jixian Dianlan Fujian Youxian Gongsi
Su Zhang Jinmei (广东吉熙安电缆附件有限公司诉张金梅) [Guangdong
Jixian Cable Accessory Co. v. Zhang Jinmei], PKULAW (Fushan Interm.
People’s Ct. 2014), available at http://www.pkulaw.cn/case/pfnl_
120588231.html?match=Exact (China).
115
See Feng Yan & Liquan Huang, Shilun Jingye Xianzhi Xieyi Yu
Shangye Mimi Zai Shenpan Shiwuzhong De Guanxi (试论竞业限制协议与商
业秘密在审判实务中的关系) [Study of the Relationship of the Non-Compete
Agreement and Trade Secret in the Practice of Hearing], JINAN LICHENG
DISTRICT COURT (May 6, 2014), available at http://jnanlcqfy.sdcourt.gov.cn/
jnanlcqfy/379762/379695/569552/index.html.
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whether a legitimate business interest exists.116
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A comparison of the non-compete systems used in the U.S. and
China show that non-competes have been as explored in China as
in the United States. Non-competes are, however, more easily
supported by Chinese courts, despite the fact that the non-compete
provision has been statutory law in China for less than ten years. In
the thirty-six cases discussed, Chinese courts paid less attention to
the analysis of “protectable business interest[s]” in non-compete
cases. In so doing, they diverge from the real purpose of a noncompete, which is to protect trade secrets. The current overenforcement of non-competes in China jeopardizes the balance
between trade secret protection and employee mobility.
A. Create a Statutory Definition of “Protectable
Business Interest”
A statutory definition of the “protectable business interest”
should be added to the Labor Contract Law or any future laws
specific to governing trade secrets. While Article 23 and 24 of
Labor Contract Law currently govern non-competes, these
provisions do not specifically mention what constitutes a
protectable business interest.
In order to solve this problem and provide guidelines for the
judges, two solutions are possible. The first is to have the Labor
Contract Law amended by the National Congress, or to have a
judicial interpretation regarding this matter issued by the Supreme
People’s Court. Either would provide clear guidance for the courts
in China; however, issuing the judicial interpretation is more
practical and much simpler when compared to the time-consuming
legislative process. For example, the pertinent part of Article 23
could be amended or interpreted (as the case may be) as follows:
“an employer and an employee may include in their labor contract
the non-compete provision which protects an employer’s
116

Id.

434

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 11:5

reasonable legitimate business interests.” If possible, the
protectable business interest should be explicitly defined with
language such as: the protectable business interest shall be defined
to include trade secrets, customer lists, specific customer
relationships, and other confidential matters with regard to
intellectual property. As a “catch all” clause, this would be
narrowly construed and only adopted in exceptional circumstances.
The second solution would be to enact a national trade secret
law, creating separate provisions for non-competes. Until now,
most trade secret-related cases have relied on Article 10 of AntiUnfair Competition Law and the related Judicial Interpretations.117
If the trade secret law were to be enacted, it may be advisable to
have a separate section to delineate the non-compete in order to
ensure that the precondition for a non-compete is the existence of a
“protectable business interest,” and to define the “protectable
business interest.”
B. Narrow the Validity of Non-Compete Agreements
The high rate of enforceability in China may jeopardize the
balance between trade secret protection and employee mobility,
which may in turn affect the spread of technology inside the
country. From the thirty-six cases previously analyzed, courts in
China paid the most attention to economic compensation rather
than restrictions such as specific employees, duration, geographic
scope, and the competitiveness of the industry. As a result, twothirds of non-compete cases have recently been found valid by
Chinese courts.
In the U.S., there is a tendency to limit the enforceability of the
non-compete in order to encourage innovation and create a
welcoming environment for technical talents.118 By learning from
the successful experiences of Silicon Valley in California and
avoiding the lesson of Route 128 in Massachusetts, some states
began to consider creating an employee-friendly non-compete
117

See Interpretation of Supreme People’s Court on Some Issues
Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Cases Involving Unfair
Competition, supra note 78.
118
See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 5.
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legal system, and several states even began to consider banning
non-competes altogether.119
China is currently transitioning from a traditional economy to a
technology-motivated economy. Therefore, in order to balance
employee mobility and trade secret protection, China should
facilitate knowledge dissemination to better meet the demands of
economic development. In a word, Chinese courts should narrow
the validity of the non-compete.
CONCLUSION
This Article provides a comparison of the ways in which legal
systems in both the U.S. and China have historically considered
non-competes and trade secret protection. Compared to the
cautious attitude to non-competes exhibited in the U.S., Chinese
courts have a far stronger tendency to support non-competes. In
addition, this Article provides an explanation for such strong
enforceability of non-competes by analyzing non-compete cases:
courts in China focus more on economic compensation and less on
protectable business interests. However, in the context of economic
transformation in China, the technology-driven economy plays an
increasingly important role in China. Therefore, it is the right time
for legislators and the courts in China to reexamine the noncompete legal regime to assure that it does not hold back employee
mobility and technology dissemination.
PRACTICE POINTERS


In the U.S., courts are often cautious in non-compete cases,
and decide an agreement’s enforceability based on the
“reasonableness” standard, where a protectable business
interest is merely one of many important factors to consider.



In China, courts focus more on economic compensation,
which is easily satisfied by employers, and less on the
factor of protectable business interests, which no exact
statutory provisions govern. As such, they have a tendency
to support non-competes.

119
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Case Name
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[杨高翔诉现代金融控股(成都)有限公司上海分公司]]
[Yang Gaoxiang v. Shanghai Branch of Xiandai Financial
Holdings (Chengdu) Co.] (Shanghai No. 1 Interm.
People’s Court, 2014)
广州天玑房地产咨询服务有限公司诉何体秀
[Guanzhou Tianji Real Estate Consulting Service Co. v.
He Tixiu] (Guangzhou Interm. People’s Court, 2014)
许绍婷诉合肥锦雯言语康复中心[Xu Shaoting v. Hefei
Jinwen Language Rehabilitation Centre] (Hefei Interm.
People’s Court, 2014)
浙江海纳电气有限公司诉周峰[Zhejiang Haina Electric
Co. v. Zhou feng] (Wenzhou Interm. People’s Court,
2014)
南京东方明珠化工有限公司诉戴维维[Nanjing Oriental
Pearl Chemical Engineering Co. v. Dai Weiwei] (Nanjing
Interm. People’s Court, 2014)
广州希创旺思电子科技有限公司诉郑浩荣[Guangzhou
Xichuang Wangsi Electronic Technology Co. v. Zheng
Haorong] (Guangzhou Interm. People’s Court, 2014)
广 州 启 圆 钢 材 加 工 有 限 公 司 诉 温 建 营 [Guangzhou
Qiyuan Steel Processing Co. v. Wen Jianying]
(Guangzhou Interm. People’s Court, 2014)
广州番禺上海三菱电梯特约销售服务有限公司诉夏国
红 [Guangzhou Fanyu Shanghai Mitsubishi Elevators
Sales & Service Co. v. Xia Guohong] (Guangzhou Interm.
People’s Court, 2014)
湖 北 省 赵 李 桥 茶 厂 有 限 责 任 公 司 诉 任 志 刚 [Hubei
Zhaoliqiao Tea Factory Co. v. Ren Zhigang] (Xianning
Interm. People’s Court, 2014)
江苏牛牌纺织机械有限公司诉邹道勇[Jiangsu Niupai
Textile Machinery Co. v. Zhou Daoyong] (Yangzhou
Interm. People’s Court, 2014)
重 庆 索 通 出 国 企 划 有 限 公 司 诉 刘 影 [Chongqing
Suotong Chuguo Planning Co. v. Liu Ying] (Chongqing
No. 5 Interm. People’s Court, 2014)
广东吉熙安电缆附件有限公司诉张金梅[Guangdong
Jixian Cable Accessory Co. v. Zhang Jinmei] (Fushan
Interm. People’s Court, 2014)
饶海波与北京市海淀区新巨人培训学校[Rao Haibo v.
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Beijing New Giant Training School] (Beijing No. 1 Interm.
People’s Court, 2015).
陈文 飞 诉 上海 宇 昂 水性 新 材料 科 技 股份 有 限 公司
[Chen Wenfei v. Shanghai Yuyang Shuixing New Material
Technology Corp.] (Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s
Court, 2015)
黄迅雷诉杭州网泰信息技术有限公司[Huang Xunlei v.
Hangzhou Wangtai Information Technology Co.]
(Hangzhou Interm. People’s Court, 2014)
胡 银 华 诉 上 海 比 迪 工 业 铝 型 材 配 件 有 限 公 司 [Hu
Yinhua v. B&D Shanghai Aluminum Industrial Profiles &
Accessories Co.] (Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Court,
2014)
纪 向 东 诉 北 京 东 方 惠 尔 图 像 技 术 有 限 公 司 [Ji
Xiangdong v. Beijing Dongfang Huier Image Technology
Co.] (Beijing No. 1 Interm. People’s Court, 2014)
陈 福 泰 诉 上 海 回 天 新 材 料 有 限 公 司 [Chen Futai v.
Shanghai Huitian New Material Co.] (Shanghai No. 1
Interm. People’s Court, 2014)
陈科萍诉浙江信互贷电子商务有限公司[Chen Keping
v. Zhejiang Xinhudai Electric Commerce Co.] (Hangzhou
Interm. People’s Court, 2014)
软 岛 科 技 ( 重 庆 ) 有 限 公 司 诉 陈 文 [Ruandao
Tecknology(Chongqing) Co. v. Chen Wen] (Chongqing
No. 5 Interm. People’s Court, 2014)
威 士 伯 ( 上 海 ) 企 业 管 理 有 限 公 司 诉 范 熠 侃 [Valspar
(Shanghai) Management Co. v. Fan Yikan] (Shanghai No.
1 Interm. People’s Court)
盖洪涛诉山东南山科学技术研究院[Gai Hongtao v.
Shandong Nanshan Scientific Technology Research
Institute] (Yantai Interm. People’s Court, 2014)
孔玲丽诉上海易佩司国际物流有限公司[Kong Lingli v.
Shanghai Yipeisi International Logistics Co.] (Shanghai
No. 1 Interm. People’s Court)
李义栋诉连云港市金荷纸业包装有限公司[Li Yidong v.
Lianyungang Jinhe Paper Packing Co.] (Lianyungang
Interm. People’s Court, 2014)
陆洲诉湖北爱康大通汽车销售服务有限公司[Luzhou
v. Hubei Aikang Datong Auto Sales & Service Co.]
(Xiaogan Interm. People’s Court, 2014)
马忠仁诉济南鲁发环保科技有限公司[Ma Zhongren v.
Jinan Lufa Environmental Protection Technology Co.]
(Jinan Interm. People’s Court, 2014)
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秦洪格诉北京神州在线科技有限公司[Qin Hongge v.
Beijing Shenzhou Online Technology Co.] (Beijing No. 1
Interm. People’s Court)
深 圳 力 方 群 英 数 字 科 技 有 限 公 司 诉 丘 秋 [Shenzhen
Lifang Qunying Digital Technology Co. v. Qiuqiu]
(Shenzhen Interm. People’s Court, 2014)
林 肯 电 气 ( 锦 州 ) 焊 接 材 料 有 限 公 司 诉 王 雷 (Jinzhou
Interm. People’s Court, 2014)
杭州恒生网络技术服务有限公司诉王云敏[Hangzhou
Hengsheng Network Technology Service Co.] (Hangzhou
Interm. People’s Court, 2014)
南京 倍 立 达新 材 料 系统 工 程股 份 有 限公 司 诉 王羿
[Nanjing Beilida New Material System Engineering Corp.
v. Wangyi] (Nanjing Interm. People’s Court, 2014)
邢玉锋诉上海德卡服装科技有限公司[Xing Yufeng v.
Shanghai Deka Clothing Technology Co.] (Shanghai No. 1
Interm. People’s Court, 2014)
重 庆 山 外 山 科 技 有 限 公 司 诉 尹 明 兰 [Chongqing
Shanwaishan Technology Co. v. Yinminglan] (Chongqing
No. 1 Interm. People’s Court, 2014)
佛 山 市 博 晖 机 电 有 限 公 司 诉 翟 良 松 [Foshan Bohui
Electromechanical Co. v. Zhai Liangsong] (Foshan
Interm. People’s Court, 2014)
赵建川诉北京神州在线科技有限公司[Zhao Jianchuan
v. Beijing Shenzhou Online Technology Co.] (Beijing
Haidian People’s Court, 2014)
沈阳和谐文化传播有限公司诉赵岩[Shenyang Hexie
Culture Communication Co. v. Zhaoyan] (Shenyang
Interm. People’s Court, 2014)
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